To all People of Good Will:
Archbishop of Cotabato
November 26, 2009
Thursday, November 26, 2009
A Crime that Cries out to Heaven
Tuesday, August 04, 2009
For Cory Aquino: Christmas Reflection, 1989
(This was written after one of the several failed coups that tried to President Aquino. I gave it to Cory Aquino to share with her my own concern for peace after three years of fledgling fragile democracy).
Peace is wisp of wind in the noonday heat
Stirring the regal pines on distant hills
Sweeping down the fields of golden rice
Cooling feverish cheeks.
Momentarily.
Peace can fade away, quickly, evanescent.
Peace is a young chirping bird
Sallying forth from its mother’s nest
Flapping its wings testing the breeze
Exploring the sky and the earth.
Blithely. Briefly.
Peace can be shot down, cruelly, fragile.
Peace is a throbbing healing “yes”
To the wailing of children for food
The outstretched hands of the poor for justice
The hunger of a nation for integrity
The blessed outrage over blood-spewing guns.
A drive. Spirit-force.
Peace is a flame in the heart searing, perduring.
Peace is frail infant on a manger
Who shall announce: To you
On whom my Father’s favour rests
I give my peace
A peace the world cannot give.
Follow me.
How, Lord, shall we follow?
To drink of your peace?
To end our wars and divisions?
Our mad scrambling for power?
How, Lord, shall we become
Sisters and brothers once more?
Pease is a passion to share, to serve
A compassion for the world’s crippled and maimed
An embrace, a crucifixion, yet freedom to be,
A love without retention limits.
Measureless breadth and depth.
Follow me, come!
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Nueva Segovia, December 8, 1989
Peace is wisp of wind in the noonday heat
Stirring the regal pines on distant hills
Sweeping down the fields of golden rice
Cooling feverish cheeks.
Momentarily.
Peace can fade away, quickly, evanescent.
Peace is a young chirping bird
Sallying forth from its mother’s nest
Flapping its wings testing the breeze
Exploring the sky and the earth.
Blithely. Briefly.
Peace can be shot down, cruelly, fragile.
Peace is a throbbing healing “yes”
To the wailing of children for food
The outstretched hands of the poor for justice
The hunger of a nation for integrity
The blessed outrage over blood-spewing guns.
A drive. Spirit-force.
Peace is a flame in the heart searing, perduring.
Peace is frail infant on a manger
Who shall announce: To you
On whom my Father’s favour rests
I give my peace
A peace the world cannot give.
Follow me.
How, Lord, shall we follow?
To drink of your peace?
To end our wars and divisions?
Our mad scrambling for power?
How, Lord, shall we become
Sisters and brothers once more?
Pease is a passion to share, to serve
A compassion for the world’s crippled and maimed
An embrace, a crucifixion, yet freedom to be,
A love without retention limits.
Measureless breadth and depth.
Follow me, come!
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Nueva Segovia, December 8, 1989
Cory—My Personal Symbol of Inang Bayan
MILLIONS of Filipinos shouted the battle cry, “Cory! Cory! Cory!,” throughout the campaign period for the Snap Elections of 1986. Finally Filipinos had real hope in ousting President Ferdinand Marcos from an office he had held since 1964.
More than an icon of democracy Cory was and is to me my personal symbol of Inang Bayan, our beloved Motherland.
I first met President Cory Aquino during her campaign sortie to Kidapawan. While many of her fellow campaigners delighted the huge crowd in the town plaza, she came for a quiet visit to the Bishop’s Residence.
She wore her signature yellow dress. Obviously she was the darling of our lay staff and she had picture taking with them. After exchanging pleasantries I asked her to go with me and visit the grave of Fr. Tullio Favali, P.I.M.E., The brutal murder of this gentle Italian missionary priest in 1985 by paramilitary forces had demonstrated for me the darkest side of the Marcos regime. We walked the few meters from the Bishop’s residence to the grave and we prayed for Fr. Tullio.
Her brief visit and presence was a lifting of the spirit for a Church that had known so much suffering from human rights abuses from 1980 to 1985.
From that time on Cory was for me the woman who best symbolized motherland, Inang Bayan. And her gracious, gentle, laid back and kind manner just reinforced that first intuition. From afar I followed her progress during the campaign and prayed for her to win.
We organized NAMFREL in Kidapawan. Thank God, most of our Clergy, Religious, and Lay Leaders were willing. A handful did not think that the elections would help and opted with the Left for boycott.
Cory campaigned with a simple down to earth, womanly and motherly style of talking, like telling a story, devoid of the oratorical and sometimes pompous style of many campaigners. Her enthusiastic reception by millions of people made it increasingly clear that change was imminent, in the air. The agents of change would be the enthusiastic millions, young and old, who listened to her and shouted “Cory! Cory! Cory!”
The Snap Elections were held on February 7, 1986. On February 13-14, 1986, the Bishops gathered in plenary assembly as they had previously agreed, should any emergency take place. This was emergency. The government press was saying that Marcos had already won the elections.
Cardinal Ricardo Vidal, the President of the Bishops’ Conference, called for each Bishop to share the experience of NAMFREL in his diocese regarding the honesty and integrity of the elections.
He asked me to moderate the session, summarize and synthesize the results. Each of the Bishops spoke. There was no doubt – the elections were filled with fraud, fraud that literally changed the results.
We then went to reflect on this situation and pray before the Blessed Sacrament. The Bishops came together again and worked on a statement which they approved by consensus. This was the dramatic post-election statement. The Bishops declared: “According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis.”
Until today I deeply regret that I had no direct hand in drafting the final statement. Cardinal Vidal had asked me to help write the draft. But I had to go to the hospital. I gave Cardinal Vidal my three essential points for a draft: (a) that the elections were substantially fraudulent; (b) that Present Marcos had no moral basis to retain power; (c) that this immoral situation had somehow to be corrected. I gave all my notes to Cardinal Vidal.
Cory called for strikes and boycotts. Then Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos broke away from the Marcos government. With that came the call of Cardinal Jaime Sin for people to go to EDSA and protect the small breakaway band of soldiers.
For me the call to EDSA was genuinely a call to protect Cory, my personal symbol of Inang Bayan.
+ORLANDO B. QUEVEDO, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
More than an icon of democracy Cory was and is to me my personal symbol of Inang Bayan, our beloved Motherland.
I first met President Cory Aquino during her campaign sortie to Kidapawan. While many of her fellow campaigners delighted the huge crowd in the town plaza, she came for a quiet visit to the Bishop’s Residence.
She wore her signature yellow dress. Obviously she was the darling of our lay staff and she had picture taking with them. After exchanging pleasantries I asked her to go with me and visit the grave of Fr. Tullio Favali, P.I.M.E., The brutal murder of this gentle Italian missionary priest in 1985 by paramilitary forces had demonstrated for me the darkest side of the Marcos regime. We walked the few meters from the Bishop’s residence to the grave and we prayed for Fr. Tullio.
Her brief visit and presence was a lifting of the spirit for a Church that had known so much suffering from human rights abuses from 1980 to 1985.
From that time on Cory was for me the woman who best symbolized motherland, Inang Bayan. And her gracious, gentle, laid back and kind manner just reinforced that first intuition. From afar I followed her progress during the campaign and prayed for her to win.
We organized NAMFREL in Kidapawan. Thank God, most of our Clergy, Religious, and Lay Leaders were willing. A handful did not think that the elections would help and opted with the Left for boycott.
Cory campaigned with a simple down to earth, womanly and motherly style of talking, like telling a story, devoid of the oratorical and sometimes pompous style of many campaigners. Her enthusiastic reception by millions of people made it increasingly clear that change was imminent, in the air. The agents of change would be the enthusiastic millions, young and old, who listened to her and shouted “Cory! Cory! Cory!”
The Snap Elections were held on February 7, 1986. On February 13-14, 1986, the Bishops gathered in plenary assembly as they had previously agreed, should any emergency take place. This was emergency. The government press was saying that Marcos had already won the elections.
Cardinal Ricardo Vidal, the President of the Bishops’ Conference, called for each Bishop to share the experience of NAMFREL in his diocese regarding the honesty and integrity of the elections.
He asked me to moderate the session, summarize and synthesize the results. Each of the Bishops spoke. There was no doubt – the elections were filled with fraud, fraud that literally changed the results.
We then went to reflect on this situation and pray before the Blessed Sacrament. The Bishops came together again and worked on a statement which they approved by consensus. This was the dramatic post-election statement. The Bishops declared: “According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis.”
Until today I deeply regret that I had no direct hand in drafting the final statement. Cardinal Vidal had asked me to help write the draft. But I had to go to the hospital. I gave Cardinal Vidal my three essential points for a draft: (a) that the elections were substantially fraudulent; (b) that Present Marcos had no moral basis to retain power; (c) that this immoral situation had somehow to be corrected. I gave all my notes to Cardinal Vidal.
Cory called for strikes and boycotts. Then Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos broke away from the Marcos government. With that came the call of Cardinal Jaime Sin for people to go to EDSA and protect the small breakaway band of soldiers.
For me the call to EDSA was genuinely a call to protect Cory, my personal symbol of Inang Bayan.
+ORLANDO B. QUEVEDO, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
Thursday, July 23, 2009
AN OPEN APPEAL FOR PEACE AND FOR OUR EVACUEES
To all Warring Parties:
As a Religious leader I respect your causes, although I may not agree with your methods.
But precisely because I am a Religious leader I strongly condemn every violent act perpetrated that has no concern for the innocent.
I condemn in the strongest terms as serious moral evil such crimes as terrorist bombings that by their very nature target the innocent, punitive raids on villages, bombardments that fall on civilian populations, landmines that can kill any passerby. For me “collateral damage” simply means murder and deliberate unjustifiable destruction of property.
War inflicts more destruction on civilians than on combatants. For every combatant killed, scores of civilians suffer or die. In the past twelve months I have seen thousands of civilians languishing in evacuation camps, first in the Pikit and PALMA areas and now in Datu Piang and various other places of Maguindanao. They give birth to babies under dismal conditions, they beg for food and water, they struggle for life in the most miserable situation. They die as statistics. Such human tragedy, it is said, has spawned brutal retaliatory terrorism elsewhere in our region.
From the depths of my soul I can only cry out to all warring parties, “Enough is enough!” End your so called search and punish operations. End your terrorist bombings. End your bombardments, end your raids, all you warring parties! Enough is enough!
Due punishment for raids has long been meted out in an attrition of casualties and damaged properties. And now what most sadly remains is the senseless logic of war, of action and reaction. And the suffering of thousands of civilian evacuees. Enough is enough!
For the sake of our evacuees and in the name of our one God of Peace, end your war! Go back to the negotiating table. Let the thousands of evacuees return safely to their home. Collaborate with one another towards this objective. Together, rehabilitate their destroyed properties. Give them another chance for a truly human life.
With the grace of the Most Merciful, Most Beneficent, Most Compassionate God, the one unique God we all believe in, there is no human conflict that cannot be solved through a genuine honest dialogue of the heart.
May the One Almighty Loving God of all have compassion on us.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
July 23, 2009
As a Religious leader I respect your causes, although I may not agree with your methods.
But precisely because I am a Religious leader I strongly condemn every violent act perpetrated that has no concern for the innocent.
I condemn in the strongest terms as serious moral evil such crimes as terrorist bombings that by their very nature target the innocent, punitive raids on villages, bombardments that fall on civilian populations, landmines that can kill any passerby. For me “collateral damage” simply means murder and deliberate unjustifiable destruction of property.
War inflicts more destruction on civilians than on combatants. For every combatant killed, scores of civilians suffer or die. In the past twelve months I have seen thousands of civilians languishing in evacuation camps, first in the Pikit and PALMA areas and now in Datu Piang and various other places of Maguindanao. They give birth to babies under dismal conditions, they beg for food and water, they struggle for life in the most miserable situation. They die as statistics. Such human tragedy, it is said, has spawned brutal retaliatory terrorism elsewhere in our region.
From the depths of my soul I can only cry out to all warring parties, “Enough is enough!” End your so called search and punish operations. End your terrorist bombings. End your bombardments, end your raids, all you warring parties! Enough is enough!
Due punishment for raids has long been meted out in an attrition of casualties and damaged properties. And now what most sadly remains is the senseless logic of war, of action and reaction. And the suffering of thousands of civilian evacuees. Enough is enough!
For the sake of our evacuees and in the name of our one God of Peace, end your war! Go back to the negotiating table. Let the thousands of evacuees return safely to their home. Collaborate with one another towards this objective. Together, rehabilitate their destroyed properties. Give them another chance for a truly human life.
With the grace of the Most Merciful, Most Beneficent, Most Compassionate God, the one unique God we all believe in, there is no human conflict that cannot be solved through a genuine honest dialogue of the heart.
May the One Almighty Loving God of all have compassion on us.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
July 23, 2009
Sunday, December 14, 2008
The Cha Cha Brouhaha
From our “remote” world of Cotabato, “far from the madding crowd” of “imperial” Manila, Manila with its peculiar concerns seems to be in another planet.
The people in the former “empire” province of Cotabato are daily generally concerned about violence, armed skirmishes, the security of the highways, floods, and the miserable plight of “bakwits”, families displaced from their homes because of armed encounters between government troops and various rebel groups, prices of basic commodities—i.e, basic necessities—the very first rung of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
Manila and our honorable legislators, as the media blare out regularly on their first pages or at prime time, are concerned about “nagbabagang balita.” Such as impeachment of the President, charter change, and senate investigations of various so called “scams.”
There is something really sad and tragic about all this. The following are some personal theses, personal thoughts really, that do not claim to reflect the opinion of the CBCP.
Thesis 1: That the House of Representatives continue to push Con Ass is truly incredible. Some would say asinine. I would tend to agree. Our Congressmen are pushing this agendum for the wrong reasons and at the wrong time. They are out of touch with their own constituents. On this important matter, they no longer represent the people but only themselves. Wrong reasons, because their motivations are not clear and transparent and people simply conclude, rightly I think, that our “representatives” only want extension of terms. Wrong time, because today the whole country and particularly the poor are facing far more urgent concerns. Our legislators need to seriously consider, for instance, the impact of economic globalization and the global financial meltdown, the growing divide between the government and the Bangsamoro, and the undeclared but continuing “war” in the Cotabato areas.
Thesis 2: The Cha Cha brouhaha is even more amusing and exasperating than the Senate investigations to “search for the truth” and the House of Representatives’ yearly attempts to impeach the President. Except for the case against former President Estrada where witnesses who were directly involved bravely came out to testify to what they saw with their own eyes in the jueteng anomaly and regarding the Velarde account, Senate investigation of various “scams” generally is a “road to nowhere.” The Senate has not been the right place to search for the truth. The process undertaken reflects an identity crisis. It is neither in “aid of legislation” nor a process of legal investigation where truth is exposed through declaration and refutation. As a result, no change in belief takes place. Anti-Gloria people remain anti-Gloria and pro-Gloria people remain pro-Gloria. But it does make the “scam” even more public without really proving that it is, indeed, a scam. But perhaps that is the agenda? Thus witnesses are said to be lying when their testimonies do not agree with what Senators may already have believed to be the truth. This is why they would want “more witnesses” to come out. The bottom line seems to be that Senate “investigations” do not really bring out the truth. They belong to the entertainment genre. But the Cha Cha brouhaha takes the cake. In this case, amusement turns to exasperation. Why, oh, why should the Lower House continue to push a concern that seems to be so self-serving and so unpopular? It pushes credibility to its lower depths. Sometimes I wonder what “Lower House” really means.
Thesis 3: Reactions in Manila to its “burning concerns” are usually exaggerated overkill or are meant to overkill. Thus the Cha Cha protest rally of yesterday. Trumpeted one newspaper, “Rage vs GMA, Con Ass.” One would think that the whole country was in rage. But only about 7,000 people led by the same names and same faces (Left, Right, and Center) with the same well known anti-Gloria agenda, showed up for the rally. If it were a Church-sponsored prayer rally for cha cha, the headline would have scoffed at the poor showing. Yet the media keeps dancing to the tune of the same crowd, same names, same faces. These keep appearing in different fora. The forum could be interfaith. It could be a political alliance activity masquerading as a prayer rally. Yearly impeachments, investigations, rallies – why, oh why do they continue? The Lozada “truth” tour fizzled out for lack of public acceptance. Rallies that pre-claim to gather 150,000 to 500,000 can only gather 15,000. The peak of protests was when Susan Roces and Cory Aquino withtheir supporters collaborated with the political opposition and the Left. They could muster only about 50,000 people. These activities are meant to dramatize what they have been trying to push forward since 2001? That Gloria stole the presidency? That everything about Gloria, what she is and what she does is “evil”? The rallies are simply overkill, a hyperbolic reaction to what is perceived as truth. Is it possible that as long as the same faces and alliances with their own questionable varying vested agenda are there, there would be no “tipping point”? Are they perhaps the wrong names, the wrong faces and the wrong groups to call people to action? Are their varying vested agenda perhaps the wrong credentials? And so they ask the Bishops of the Philippines to help them. But is the situation really a matter of “searching for the truth” as the Bishops have consistently urged? Or is it for these groups a matter of the truth already incontrovertibly arrived at?
Thesis 4: My personal position on Cha Cha is the following –
a. No process of charter change should be allowed that intends to extend terms of office;
b. The elections in 2010 must proceed;
c. If charter change is to proceed it must not be by constituent assembly but by constitutional convention;
d. I have a personal conviction about two provisions: a new constitution must not do away with the pro-life and pro-poor provisions of the present Constitution; it must also provide a constitutional basis for Moro self-determination, without violating national sovereignty and territorial integrity;
e. There must be widespread people consultation regarding what needs to be changed in the Constitution;
f. The whole process must be imbued with integrity and transparency;
g. The bottom line is this: this is not the time for a constitutional change; the Bishops of the Philippines have, since the time of President Ramos, repeatedly said that if constitutional change is, indeed, necessary it should be at a time of social serenity, with no polarizing political divisions, with widespread people participation, and through a constitutional convention.
Thesis 5: I base the above position not on any political reason but on the social moral teachings of the Church. I cite particularly the principles of the common good, social justice and truth, freedom and self-determination, participation, integral human development including cultural, and the proper role of political authority. These, I believe, might be the moral bases of any statement that the CBCP could issue on the subject of the cha cha brouhaha.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
December 14, 2008
The people in the former “empire” province of Cotabato are daily generally concerned about violence, armed skirmishes, the security of the highways, floods, and the miserable plight of “bakwits”, families displaced from their homes because of armed encounters between government troops and various rebel groups, prices of basic commodities—i.e, basic necessities—the very first rung of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.
Manila and our honorable legislators, as the media blare out regularly on their first pages or at prime time, are concerned about “nagbabagang balita.” Such as impeachment of the President, charter change, and senate investigations of various so called “scams.”
There is something really sad and tragic about all this. The following are some personal theses, personal thoughts really, that do not claim to reflect the opinion of the CBCP.
Thesis 1: That the House of Representatives continue to push Con Ass is truly incredible. Some would say asinine. I would tend to agree. Our Congressmen are pushing this agendum for the wrong reasons and at the wrong time. They are out of touch with their own constituents. On this important matter, they no longer represent the people but only themselves. Wrong reasons, because their motivations are not clear and transparent and people simply conclude, rightly I think, that our “representatives” only want extension of terms. Wrong time, because today the whole country and particularly the poor are facing far more urgent concerns. Our legislators need to seriously consider, for instance, the impact of economic globalization and the global financial meltdown, the growing divide between the government and the Bangsamoro, and the undeclared but continuing “war” in the Cotabato areas.
Thesis 2: The Cha Cha brouhaha is even more amusing and exasperating than the Senate investigations to “search for the truth” and the House of Representatives’ yearly attempts to impeach the President. Except for the case against former President Estrada where witnesses who were directly involved bravely came out to testify to what they saw with their own eyes in the jueteng anomaly and regarding the Velarde account, Senate investigation of various “scams” generally is a “road to nowhere.” The Senate has not been the right place to search for the truth. The process undertaken reflects an identity crisis. It is neither in “aid of legislation” nor a process of legal investigation where truth is exposed through declaration and refutation. As a result, no change in belief takes place. Anti-Gloria people remain anti-Gloria and pro-Gloria people remain pro-Gloria. But it does make the “scam” even more public without really proving that it is, indeed, a scam. But perhaps that is the agenda? Thus witnesses are said to be lying when their testimonies do not agree with what Senators may already have believed to be the truth. This is why they would want “more witnesses” to come out. The bottom line seems to be that Senate “investigations” do not really bring out the truth. They belong to the entertainment genre. But the Cha Cha brouhaha takes the cake. In this case, amusement turns to exasperation. Why, oh, why should the Lower House continue to push a concern that seems to be so self-serving and so unpopular? It pushes credibility to its lower depths. Sometimes I wonder what “Lower House” really means.
Thesis 3: Reactions in Manila to its “burning concerns” are usually exaggerated overkill or are meant to overkill. Thus the Cha Cha protest rally of yesterday. Trumpeted one newspaper, “Rage vs GMA, Con Ass.” One would think that the whole country was in rage. But only about 7,000 people led by the same names and same faces (Left, Right, and Center) with the same well known anti-Gloria agenda, showed up for the rally. If it were a Church-sponsored prayer rally for cha cha, the headline would have scoffed at the poor showing. Yet the media keeps dancing to the tune of the same crowd, same names, same faces. These keep appearing in different fora. The forum could be interfaith. It could be a political alliance activity masquerading as a prayer rally. Yearly impeachments, investigations, rallies – why, oh why do they continue? The Lozada “truth” tour fizzled out for lack of public acceptance. Rallies that pre-claim to gather 150,000 to 500,000 can only gather 15,000. The peak of protests was when Susan Roces and Cory Aquino withtheir supporters collaborated with the political opposition and the Left. They could muster only about 50,000 people. These activities are meant to dramatize what they have been trying to push forward since 2001? That Gloria stole the presidency? That everything about Gloria, what she is and what she does is “evil”? The rallies are simply overkill, a hyperbolic reaction to what is perceived as truth. Is it possible that as long as the same faces and alliances with their own questionable varying vested agenda are there, there would be no “tipping point”? Are they perhaps the wrong names, the wrong faces and the wrong groups to call people to action? Are their varying vested agenda perhaps the wrong credentials? And so they ask the Bishops of the Philippines to help them. But is the situation really a matter of “searching for the truth” as the Bishops have consistently urged? Or is it for these groups a matter of the truth already incontrovertibly arrived at?
Thesis 4: My personal position on Cha Cha is the following –
a. No process of charter change should be allowed that intends to extend terms of office;
b. The elections in 2010 must proceed;
c. If charter change is to proceed it must not be by constituent assembly but by constitutional convention;
d. I have a personal conviction about two provisions: a new constitution must not do away with the pro-life and pro-poor provisions of the present Constitution; it must also provide a constitutional basis for Moro self-determination, without violating national sovereignty and territorial integrity;
e. There must be widespread people consultation regarding what needs to be changed in the Constitution;
f. The whole process must be imbued with integrity and transparency;
g. The bottom line is this: this is not the time for a constitutional change; the Bishops of the Philippines have, since the time of President Ramos, repeatedly said that if constitutional change is, indeed, necessary it should be at a time of social serenity, with no polarizing political divisions, with widespread people participation, and through a constitutional convention.
Thesis 5: I base the above position not on any political reason but on the social moral teachings of the Church. I cite particularly the principles of the common good, social justice and truth, freedom and self-determination, participation, integral human development including cultural, and the proper role of political authority. These, I believe, might be the moral bases of any statement that the CBCP could issue on the subject of the cha cha brouhaha.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
December 14, 2008
Thursday, September 04, 2008
Two Fundamental Postulates for Lasting Peace in Mindanao
After the tragic fiasco regarding the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), I presume as a matter of course that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front are incontact with its other.
As a contribution to any backdoor channeling, I address myself to both Moros and non-Moros, and those who claim to represent them.
The following, I believe, are the two fundamental bases for the forging of lasting peace in Mindanao. At the very beginning of any peace negotiation, there has to be a clear and explicit recognition, mutually accepted: (1) of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution; (2) of the Moro aspiration for self determination and its concrete realization in a manner in accord with the Philippine Constitution. It seems to me that these fundamental concepts are at lease implicitly accepted by both groups.
I believe that the lack of clarity in the MOA-AD with regard to the above two-fold fundamental concepts, aggravated by lack of consultation and reinforced by anger, misinformation, misconceptions, biases, prejudices, and resistance to change, led to the present grave uncertainties regarding the peace process.
The first postulate is clear to non-Moros. The second is not. For most of us the recognition of Moro self-determination and the Bangsamoro Juridical entity in which it is exercised are tantamount to giving away parts of Philippine territory and establishing a Moro independent State. It does not matter if there are several examples in the world, where self-determination is recognized and implemented without necessarily establishing an independent State and dismembering a Republic. It does not matter if the rejected MOA-AD does not in any way express such establishment or dismembering. Great anger and violence have resulted from this situation.
The non-Moro should begin with Moro history to understand Moro self-determination. It is undisputed that Islam was brought to the Philippines before the Spaniards came, even before there was such a name as “Philippines.” It is undisputed that Muslim Sultanates exercised sovereignty and wielded political power over most of Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi and Sulu, a territory considerably larger than the present ARMM or the “expanded ARMM” that the MOA-AD envisions. It is undisputed that the demographic composition of the population and the subject of political authority in Mindanao were completely reversed from Moros to non-Moros within only the 50 years between 1920 to 1970, such that Moros became a minority in the large swath of territory over which they, through their Sultanates, once held sway.
We, therefore, need to accept the fact that the Moro aspiration for self-determination is based on indisputable recorded history Our historical consciousness needs to go back to the times of the southern Sultanates and the religion they professed. There we see a people from the Malay race but with a distinct religion and political identity. They had been part of the indigenous peoples who had converted to Islam. We know that the term “Moro” came much later in their history, introduced by Spanish colonizers to refer derogatively to the people who had the same religion as the Moors that had conquered southern Spain. Through the Sultanates this distinct people from various indigenous tribes held political sway, sovereignty, if one may use the term, over a territory covering most of Mindanao and Sulu. Through the Sultans they governed themselves. At documented periods and occasions, Moros expressed their aspiration for self-determination either by peaceful means or by armed interventions. This aspiration has endured through four centuries of relative peace and short periods of war. Restlessness for self-determination lies deep in the collective Moro subconscious. Like Rizal and the Filipino elite of their time, Moro scholars, intellectuals, writers, warriors and leaders kept this aspiration alive.
The desire for self-determination we recognize now as a fundamental right. It does not necessarily mean an independent State. It simply means as a common attribute of all peoples an option for self-government outside or within a national community. It is an option that is enduring, lying deep in the subconscious of the human community, part and parcel of that divine gift we call freedom, or self-determination. It does not die. It maybe dormant, it might be repressed, but sooner or later it will want to surface either in rebellion or in peaceful assertion. War will not defeat this fundamental human option. It cannot be killed. Without recognition and some form of implementation, peaceful co-existence is simply an artificial temporary veneer. That is the human condition, the condition of human communities with distinct cultures and identities, especially with a history of self-determination.
Recognizing that legitimate aspiration, we also need to recognize the realities that came during the American period of our history. Spain ceded the entire islands to the United States. It was the United States that eventually and effectively placed all the islands under its political power. Yet even the United States recognized the aspiration of the Moro people with the creation of a “Moro province.” Historical records tell us that from time to time, Moro leaders would remind the ruling power of their right to self-determination, of not wanting to be under “Filipino” sovereignty.
But we cannot also escape the development of history. The historical reality is that the the United States, followed by the Philippine government, exercised political power over all of the Philippines. And so we have the concepts of national sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in successive Constitutions. Even if one might not accept the Constitution, the reality of national sovereignty and territorial integrity predates the Constitution which simply came later to express or articulate the reality.
These then are the two-fold realities that are fundamental to any peace negotiation: the recognition of Moro self-determination and the acceptance of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
These two concepts are not contradictory. They do not cancel each other out. One can exist with the other. It is the balancing and concrete implementing of these two fundamental postulates that is the central task of peace negotiating.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
September 4, 2008
As a contribution to any backdoor channeling, I address myself to both Moros and non-Moros, and those who claim to represent them.
The following, I believe, are the two fundamental bases for the forging of lasting peace in Mindanao. At the very beginning of any peace negotiation, there has to be a clear and explicit recognition, mutually accepted: (1) of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution; (2) of the Moro aspiration for self determination and its concrete realization in a manner in accord with the Philippine Constitution. It seems to me that these fundamental concepts are at lease implicitly accepted by both groups.
I believe that the lack of clarity in the MOA-AD with regard to the above two-fold fundamental concepts, aggravated by lack of consultation and reinforced by anger, misinformation, misconceptions, biases, prejudices, and resistance to change, led to the present grave uncertainties regarding the peace process.
The first postulate is clear to non-Moros. The second is not. For most of us the recognition of Moro self-determination and the Bangsamoro Juridical entity in which it is exercised are tantamount to giving away parts of Philippine territory and establishing a Moro independent State. It does not matter if there are several examples in the world, where self-determination is recognized and implemented without necessarily establishing an independent State and dismembering a Republic. It does not matter if the rejected MOA-AD does not in any way express such establishment or dismembering. Great anger and violence have resulted from this situation.
The non-Moro should begin with Moro history to understand Moro self-determination. It is undisputed that Islam was brought to the Philippines before the Spaniards came, even before there was such a name as “Philippines.” It is undisputed that Muslim Sultanates exercised sovereignty and wielded political power over most of Mindanao, Tawi-Tawi and Sulu, a territory considerably larger than the present ARMM or the “expanded ARMM” that the MOA-AD envisions. It is undisputed that the demographic composition of the population and the subject of political authority in Mindanao were completely reversed from Moros to non-Moros within only the 50 years between 1920 to 1970, such that Moros became a minority in the large swath of territory over which they, through their Sultanates, once held sway.
We, therefore, need to accept the fact that the Moro aspiration for self-determination is based on indisputable recorded history Our historical consciousness needs to go back to the times of the southern Sultanates and the religion they professed. There we see a people from the Malay race but with a distinct religion and political identity. They had been part of the indigenous peoples who had converted to Islam. We know that the term “Moro” came much later in their history, introduced by Spanish colonizers to refer derogatively to the people who had the same religion as the Moors that had conquered southern Spain. Through the Sultanates this distinct people from various indigenous tribes held political sway, sovereignty, if one may use the term, over a territory covering most of Mindanao and Sulu. Through the Sultans they governed themselves. At documented periods and occasions, Moros expressed their aspiration for self-determination either by peaceful means or by armed interventions. This aspiration has endured through four centuries of relative peace and short periods of war. Restlessness for self-determination lies deep in the collective Moro subconscious. Like Rizal and the Filipino elite of their time, Moro scholars, intellectuals, writers, warriors and leaders kept this aspiration alive.
The desire for self-determination we recognize now as a fundamental right. It does not necessarily mean an independent State. It simply means as a common attribute of all peoples an option for self-government outside or within a national community. It is an option that is enduring, lying deep in the subconscious of the human community, part and parcel of that divine gift we call freedom, or self-determination. It does not die. It maybe dormant, it might be repressed, but sooner or later it will want to surface either in rebellion or in peaceful assertion. War will not defeat this fundamental human option. It cannot be killed. Without recognition and some form of implementation, peaceful co-existence is simply an artificial temporary veneer. That is the human condition, the condition of human communities with distinct cultures and identities, especially with a history of self-determination.
Recognizing that legitimate aspiration, we also need to recognize the realities that came during the American period of our history. Spain ceded the entire islands to the United States. It was the United States that eventually and effectively placed all the islands under its political power. Yet even the United States recognized the aspiration of the Moro people with the creation of a “Moro province.” Historical records tell us that from time to time, Moro leaders would remind the ruling power of their right to self-determination, of not wanting to be under “Filipino” sovereignty.
But we cannot also escape the development of history. The historical reality is that the the United States, followed by the Philippine government, exercised political power over all of the Philippines. And so we have the concepts of national sovereignty and territorial integrity enshrined in successive Constitutions. Even if one might not accept the Constitution, the reality of national sovereignty and territorial integrity predates the Constitution which simply came later to express or articulate the reality.
These then are the two-fold realities that are fundamental to any peace negotiation: the recognition of Moro self-determination and the acceptance of national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
These two concepts are not contradictory. They do not cancel each other out. One can exist with the other. It is the balancing and concrete implementing of these two fundamental postulates that is the central task of peace negotiating.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
September 4, 2008
A General Roadmap towards Lasting Peace in Mindanao
In the light of the impasse, lack of clarity, and confusion that have resulted from the MOA-AD fiasco, may I respectfully submit the following suggestion for the peace process to move forward.
As essential talking points representing a roadmap towards lasting peace in Mindanao, I believe that the following issues should be agreed upon by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF):
Any peace process in Mindanao must accept two basic principles: the Moro fundamental aspiration for self-determination and the Philippine government’s right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The beginning of a solution to balance Moro aspiration for self-determination and Philippine national sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution is already partly expressed in the concept of ARMM. Despite its many inadequacies the ARMM is an exercise of self-determination in the form of autonomy within the framework of the Philippine Constitution. A more developed balancing elaborating constitutes the road to lasting peace.
The road to lasting peace involves a wholistic solution, political, economic, cultural, and religious.
A political solution, much less a military solution, will not suffice nor will a simply economic one, without the political and cultural/religious. The ill-fated Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is an attempt to provide a wholistic solution.
The road to lasting peace must resolve the following issues:
(a) the issue of representation in the peace agreement – does the GRP panel really represent the Philippine government; does the MILF really represent the Bangsamoro and the Lumad;
(b) the issue of prior and informed consultation with their respective constituencies;
(c) the issue of the territorial coverage of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE);
(d) the issue of the powers (e.g., judicial, executive, legislative, economic, diplomatic, military, territorial) of the BJE;
(e) the issue of the relationship between the BJE and the Republic of the Philippines (e.g. is the BJE clearly understood as part and parcel of the Republic of the Philippines);
(f) the issue of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation / reintegration (while the actual implementation could wait for the endgame of the peace process, its discussion should be introduced much earlier as in the experience of successful peace processes).
Given the above roadmap, the road ahead consists of the following elements:
(a) continuing the peace process within the parameters presented in number one above;
(b) resolving the questions enumerated in number three above;
(c) forging a unity of opinion – consensus – on the basis of all the above points through widespread consultations by both sides;
(d) building constituencies in order to support the peace process;
(e) stopping all armed conflicts during any peace negotiation.
Any military or violent reaction to respond to the striking down of the MOA-AD would merely reinforce the mindsets of bias, prejudice, anger, and resentment. Even now the volatile situation is threatening to explode through further acts of terrorism and the arming of civilians on both sides of the cultural divide.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
September 4, 2005
As essential talking points representing a roadmap towards lasting peace in Mindanao, I believe that the following issues should be agreed upon by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF):
Any peace process in Mindanao must accept two basic principles: the Moro fundamental aspiration for self-determination and the Philippine government’s right to national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The beginning of a solution to balance Moro aspiration for self-determination and Philippine national sovereignty and territorial integrity as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution is already partly expressed in the concept of ARMM. Despite its many inadequacies the ARMM is an exercise of self-determination in the form of autonomy within the framework of the Philippine Constitution. A more developed balancing elaborating constitutes the road to lasting peace.
The road to lasting peace involves a wholistic solution, political, economic, cultural, and religious.
A political solution, much less a military solution, will not suffice nor will a simply economic one, without the political and cultural/religious. The ill-fated Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is an attempt to provide a wholistic solution.
The road to lasting peace must resolve the following issues:
(a) the issue of representation in the peace agreement – does the GRP panel really represent the Philippine government; does the MILF really represent the Bangsamoro and the Lumad;
(b) the issue of prior and informed consultation with their respective constituencies;
(c) the issue of the territorial coverage of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE);
(d) the issue of the powers (e.g., judicial, executive, legislative, economic, diplomatic, military, territorial) of the BJE;
(e) the issue of the relationship between the BJE and the Republic of the Philippines (e.g. is the BJE clearly understood as part and parcel of the Republic of the Philippines);
(f) the issue of disarmament, demobilization, and rehabilitation / reintegration (while the actual implementation could wait for the endgame of the peace process, its discussion should be introduced much earlier as in the experience of successful peace processes).
Given the above roadmap, the road ahead consists of the following elements:
(a) continuing the peace process within the parameters presented in number one above;
(b) resolving the questions enumerated in number three above;
(c) forging a unity of opinion – consensus – on the basis of all the above points through widespread consultations by both sides;
(d) building constituencies in order to support the peace process;
(e) stopping all armed conflicts during any peace negotiation.
Any military or violent reaction to respond to the striking down of the MOA-AD would merely reinforce the mindsets of bias, prejudice, anger, and resentment. Even now the volatile situation is threatening to explode through further acts of terrorism and the arming of civilians on both sides of the cultural divide.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
September 4, 2005
Friday, August 29, 2008
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front – a Terrorist Organization?
In the aftermath of the ruthless attacks by three MILF field commanders on civilian populations in North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, and Sarangani, the question of the MILF as a terrorist organization has again been raised.
The issue: Is the MILF a terrorist organization and should it be officially declared so?
The usual non-Moro response is, “Yes. The MILF has once again revealed its true colors. It has attacked towns and villages. It has gone on a rampage, killing innocent civilians, murdering, burning, pillaging, looting, using civilians as human shields – these are terrorist acts. Therefore, the MILF is a terrorist organization.”
The Moro general reaction seems to be: “Indeed, these acts are not morally unjustifiable. They are to be condemned. But these do not make the MILF a terrorist organization. These acts were perpetrated by MILF commanders acting on their own against MILF official policy. We deeply regret such acts. They have given a bad name to the MILF. They have seriously set back the peace process.”
Listening to many Moros speak on this issue, I would add the following remarks to this general Moro reaction: “Like us these MILF commanders were angry at the rejection of the MOA-AD by the government. Like us they saw the long peaceful work towards the recognition of our aspirations for self-determination dismissed by the Supreme Court. Anger led them to violence. We do not agree with their reaction but we can understand why.” I might also add this reaction by a few radically inclined Moro thinkers: “We are not asking for independence. But if the government refuses to recognize our fundamental right to self-determination, why don’t we all unite and just go ahead and fight for independence?”
In the light of such context, the real question is: Does the brutal violence of three MILF commanders on civilian populations in Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, and Sarangani make the whole MILF organization terrorist?
Many Christians all over the Philippines would say yes. Against the opinion of many of my own Christian flock whom I serve as Archbishop, I say no.
May I submit the following points for sober reflection:
Among the scores of MILF commanders in Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Shariff Kabungsuan, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi, how many actually supported the action of the three commanders?
How many instead followed the official policy of the MILF about civilian populations?
Did the MILF Central Committee authorize the action of the three commanders?
Did the Central Committee not try to stop the three commanders?
Did our own military and ceasefire mechanisms not try to limit military objectives and the areas of operation so as to target only the forces of the three commanders?
Did the three commanders act like the Abu Sayaff and take 12 or even only two “kidnappable” people for ransom when they could have easily done so?
Does not the MILF Central Committee believe that the actions of its three commanders have seriously set back the peace process?
If the MILF were a terrorist organization like the Abu Sayaff and Al-Qaeda, would it even have ceased fighting to talk peace?
Would it ever have cooperated with our military to go after bandits going to their areas of influence?
Did investigations on atrocities committed against our Marines in Basilan provide evidence that such atrocities were perpetrated by MILF ambushers?
On the other hand:
We do not believe that our own government with our own military is terrorist, even if:
We had military commanders leading so called “lost commands” that operated freely on their own in Mindanao;
Our troops never really pursued them and rooted them out;
We never brought them to the courts of justice;
Fanatical vigilante groups known for their ruthlessness against Moro civilians were tolerated and even worked quietly with our military commanders;
Our military forces attacked Camp Abubakar, reportedly hours after an accord for ceasefire had been agreed upon;
We never investigated and brought to justice our own soldiers who were accused by human rights organizations for abuses against civilians, whether Moros or non-Moros;
Reflecting on the above questions and soberly responding to them would surely bring us to a wiser position on the issue of terrorism. We need to be more logical and wise in judging the MILF organization as terrorist on the ground that some of its commanders have perpetrated terrorist acts. The actions of a few are not necessarily the actions of the whole.
Mutatis mutandis we also apply, I believe, the same principle and the same logic regarding “scalawags” in the Church, media, military, police, executive, judiciary, and legislative branches of government. We do not necessarily judge the whole by the actions of the few.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 29, 2008
The issue: Is the MILF a terrorist organization and should it be officially declared so?
The usual non-Moro response is, “Yes. The MILF has once again revealed its true colors. It has attacked towns and villages. It has gone on a rampage, killing innocent civilians, murdering, burning, pillaging, looting, using civilians as human shields – these are terrorist acts. Therefore, the MILF is a terrorist organization.”
The Moro general reaction seems to be: “Indeed, these acts are not morally unjustifiable. They are to be condemned. But these do not make the MILF a terrorist organization. These acts were perpetrated by MILF commanders acting on their own against MILF official policy. We deeply regret such acts. They have given a bad name to the MILF. They have seriously set back the peace process.”
Listening to many Moros speak on this issue, I would add the following remarks to this general Moro reaction: “Like us these MILF commanders were angry at the rejection of the MOA-AD by the government. Like us they saw the long peaceful work towards the recognition of our aspirations for self-determination dismissed by the Supreme Court. Anger led them to violence. We do not agree with their reaction but we can understand why.” I might also add this reaction by a few radically inclined Moro thinkers: “We are not asking for independence. But if the government refuses to recognize our fundamental right to self-determination, why don’t we all unite and just go ahead and fight for independence?”
In the light of such context, the real question is: Does the brutal violence of three MILF commanders on civilian populations in Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, and Sarangani make the whole MILF organization terrorist?
Many Christians all over the Philippines would say yes. Against the opinion of many of my own Christian flock whom I serve as Archbishop, I say no.
May I submit the following points for sober reflection:
Among the scores of MILF commanders in Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Shariff Kabungsuan, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi, how many actually supported the action of the three commanders?
How many instead followed the official policy of the MILF about civilian populations?
Did the MILF Central Committee authorize the action of the three commanders?
Did the Central Committee not try to stop the three commanders?
Did our own military and ceasefire mechanisms not try to limit military objectives and the areas of operation so as to target only the forces of the three commanders?
Did the three commanders act like the Abu Sayaff and take 12 or even only two “kidnappable” people for ransom when they could have easily done so?
Does not the MILF Central Committee believe that the actions of its three commanders have seriously set back the peace process?
If the MILF were a terrorist organization like the Abu Sayaff and Al-Qaeda, would it even have ceased fighting to talk peace?
Would it ever have cooperated with our military to go after bandits going to their areas of influence?
Did investigations on atrocities committed against our Marines in Basilan provide evidence that such atrocities were perpetrated by MILF ambushers?
On the other hand:
We do not believe that our own government with our own military is terrorist, even if:
We had military commanders leading so called “lost commands” that operated freely on their own in Mindanao;
Our troops never really pursued them and rooted them out;
We never brought them to the courts of justice;
Fanatical vigilante groups known for their ruthlessness against Moro civilians were tolerated and even worked quietly with our military commanders;
Our military forces attacked Camp Abubakar, reportedly hours after an accord for ceasefire had been agreed upon;
We never investigated and brought to justice our own soldiers who were accused by human rights organizations for abuses against civilians, whether Moros or non-Moros;
Reflecting on the above questions and soberly responding to them would surely bring us to a wiser position on the issue of terrorism. We need to be more logical and wise in judging the MILF organization as terrorist on the ground that some of its commanders have perpetrated terrorist acts. The actions of a few are not necessarily the actions of the whole.
Mutatis mutandis we also apply, I believe, the same principle and the same logic regarding “scalawags” in the Church, media, military, police, executive, judiciary, and legislative branches of government. We do not necessarily judge the whole by the actions of the few.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 29, 2008
Monday, August 18, 2008
Judging the MOA-AD: A Parable for Our Time
This is the first of two reflections on how to assess the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF in the light of our quest for lasting peace in Mindanao.
Many people reject the MOA-AD because they say the document is giving away Philippine territory to the Moros. It is a dismembering the Philippine Republic.
Other reasons for absolute rejection are:
*The Filipino people were not consulted.
*Even if there will be plebiscites, these will be rigged to favor the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity;
*The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity is simply another name for an Islamic State independent of the Philippines;
*President Macapagal-Arroyo allegedly wants the MOA-AD because it would mean a change in the Constitution to extend her term;
*The President is allegedly so corrupt that we cannot simply trust her with any agreement;
*The United States reportedly influenced the peace process and the MOA-AD because it wants an American military base in southern Philippines and has economic interests in the area.
One observes that most of the above reasons are external to the contents of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD is not being judged on its own merits. The document is being rejected because of suspicions regarding possible circumstances surrounding it.
For this reason may I tell a story.
The master told his disciples this parable. Jane, a jeweler, saw a beautiful diamond in a shop. She admired and desired it. Unfortunately her competitor, Juan, owned the shop. Juan was reputed to be dishonest and always wanted to take advantage of his customers. But the more Jane looked at the diamond, the more she liked it. So she asked Juan, “How much is that diamond?” “750,000 pesos,” said Juan. Jane was shocked. “The price is too high for such a small diamond!” “Take it or leave it,” answered Juan. But Jane really liked the diamond. So she asked, “Is it genuine?” Another gentleman entered the conversation and said, “Oh, yes. I certify it is genuine. By the way my name is William. I shaped the diamond myself.” Really desiring the diamond, Jane said, “I know you, but can I have the diamond examined?” Both Juan and William agreed. So the next day, Jane brought her husband, Jose, who was an expert diamond examiner. Using his examining tools, Jose scrutinized the diamond from every angle for a whole hour, noting every facet of it. Then he took his wife aside and whispered to her, “You know how much I dislike Juan and suspect that fellow William. I must admit that the diamond is 100% genuine. There is no doubt. But I have noticed certain flaws in the shaping. So try to bring the price down, we can correct the flaws.” So Jane bargained. After a while, Juan and Jane agreed on 700,000 pesos. Both were happy and became good friends.
The disciples asked, “Master, why did Jane buy the diamond from people she did not trust?” “Because the diamond, though imperfect, was genuine,” said the Master.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 17, 2008
Many people reject the MOA-AD because they say the document is giving away Philippine territory to the Moros. It is a dismembering the Philippine Republic.
Other reasons for absolute rejection are:
*The Filipino people were not consulted.
*Even if there will be plebiscites, these will be rigged to favor the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity;
*The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity is simply another name for an Islamic State independent of the Philippines;
*President Macapagal-Arroyo allegedly wants the MOA-AD because it would mean a change in the Constitution to extend her term;
*The President is allegedly so corrupt that we cannot simply trust her with any agreement;
*The United States reportedly influenced the peace process and the MOA-AD because it wants an American military base in southern Philippines and has economic interests in the area.
One observes that most of the above reasons are external to the contents of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD is not being judged on its own merits. The document is being rejected because of suspicions regarding possible circumstances surrounding it.
For this reason may I tell a story.
The master told his disciples this parable. Jane, a jeweler, saw a beautiful diamond in a shop. She admired and desired it. Unfortunately her competitor, Juan, owned the shop. Juan was reputed to be dishonest and always wanted to take advantage of his customers. But the more Jane looked at the diamond, the more she liked it. So she asked Juan, “How much is that diamond?” “750,000 pesos,” said Juan. Jane was shocked. “The price is too high for such a small diamond!” “Take it or leave it,” answered Juan. But Jane really liked the diamond. So she asked, “Is it genuine?” Another gentleman entered the conversation and said, “Oh, yes. I certify it is genuine. By the way my name is William. I shaped the diamond myself.” Really desiring the diamond, Jane said, “I know you, but can I have the diamond examined?” Both Juan and William agreed. So the next day, Jane brought her husband, Jose, who was an expert diamond examiner. Using his examining tools, Jose scrutinized the diamond from every angle for a whole hour, noting every facet of it. Then he took his wife aside and whispered to her, “You know how much I dislike Juan and suspect that fellow William. I must admit that the diamond is 100% genuine. There is no doubt. But I have noticed certain flaws in the shaping. So try to bring the price down, we can correct the flaws.” So Jane bargained. After a while, Juan and Jane agreed on 700,000 pesos. Both were happy and became good friends.
The disciples asked, “Master, why did Jane buy the diamond from people she did not trust?” “Because the diamond, though imperfect, was genuine,” said the Master.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 17, 2008
Sunday, August 17, 2008
Let the MOA-AD Speak for Itself
Violence is breaking out once again in Southern Philippines. Doubly tragic because such violence could be prevented. The popular rejection of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain has separated the positions of Moros and Christians quite clearly.
Many Moros are now saying, “Christians will never recognize our fundamental right to self-determination as a people. We do not want an independent State. We simply want self-determination in our ancestral land.” On the other hand, Christian Filipinos are passionately affirming their stand, “We do not want to be driven away from our lands. We do not want any Philippine territory to be taken away. We do not want to be part of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity.”
The great tragedy for the country is that the MOA-AD is being rejected for reasons that can be resolved or may not even be in the MOA-AD. It is as though our fears and prejudices have become the measure for judging the Memorandum of Agreement. There is no substitute to actually reading and studying the document – in itself – to know what it says, to know what it does not say, and to realize the implications of all these. By rejecting the Memorandum of Agreement on the basis of misconception, prejudices and misinformation, we may be throwing out a “piece of paper” that could very well be a good working basis for lasting peace in Mindanao.
Many Filipinos reject the MOA-AD mainly on the following bases:
(1) It is dismembering the Republic of the Philippines;
(2) It has certain unacceptable or at least questionable provisions;
(3) The Filipino people were not consulted;
(4) The present government cannot be trusted;
(5) President Arroyo wants the MOA-AD in order to extend her term;
(6) The United States had a “hidden” hand in the MOA-AD because of its own interests.
The first and second objections concern the content of the MOA-AD. The third objection is about process. The third, fourth, fifth and sixth objections are about circumstances external to the document.
I believe that all of us should let the MOA-AD speak for itself. To do this may I suggest some points for reflection.
On the concept of Bangsamoro self-determination:
*Do Christian Filipinos recognize that the right to self-determination is a fundamental right?
*Is such a right unconstitutional?
*Are the Bangsamoro people entitled to such a right?
On the Bangsamoro homeland or ancestral domain:
*In their history have the Bangsamoro people ever exercised the right to self-determination and sovereignty?
*Are we, Christian Filipinos, aware that even before the Spaniards came, the Bangsamoro people already had a system of political authority that held sway over a domain that covered most parts of Mindanao and Sulu?
*Despite Spanish and American colonizers, did leaders of the Bangsamoro people continue to claim political authority over their ancestral domain?
*Within the short space of 50 years, from the 1920s to the 1970s, did not Christian Filipinos completely reverse the demographic, territorial, and political situation in Mindanao and Sulu partly through a series of land laws that sent several waves of migrating Christians from the Visayas and Luzon?
*Are we aware that while we Christians call this historical, demographic, and political development quite legal, members of the Bangsamoro believed and continue to believe that this was an injustice to their historic claim to their lands and to the self-determination that they – for a long time – once exercised in their territory?
On Bangsamoro self-determination and exercise of sovereignty in relation to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity:
*Does Bangsamoro self-determination and exercise of sovereignty in their ancestral domain necessarily mean political independence from the Republic of the Philippines?
*Does the MOA-AD say that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity is a separate and independent State? Does it intend to set up such a State?
Is there internal evidence in the MOA-AD that in fact it does not intend to do so, and that the agreement is not setting up an independent State?
*Does the MOA-AD say, even if only equivalently, that it is breaking up the territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines?
If the document has internal merits, surely the problems of lack of consultation can be worked out. Flaws in the concepts and content can be remedied. Suspicions about the hidden hand of the United States or the hidden intentions of the President Macapagal Arroyo behind charter change can be resolved in their own context. But these to my mind are basically extraneous to the internal validity of the MOA-AD. We can surely correct its faults.
But to reject the MOA-AD completely on the basis of what it does not say could be a tragedy of incalculable proportion, possibly a death knell to lasting peace. The two panels have painstakingly worked out the peace documents for 11 long years. I would give them the benefit of the doubt that they have been conscientious in their work, looking out for the interests of their constituencies.
It is my firm conviction that if only the MOA-AD is allowed to speak for itself or examined on its own merits, it can be a good working document for lasting peace in Mindanao.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 17, 2008
Saturday, August 09, 2008
The MOA-AD, a Memorandum of Intent?
(Fifth of a Series)
The distinct impression that the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines gives me is that the title is a misnomer. The document is effectively a Memorandum of Intent.
The MOA-AD purports to be precisely what it says, a memorandum of agreement by the MILF and GRP. Both parties agree on the various points of the memo. And presumably both agree to implement them. In this sense the document is a memo of agreement. But can the two panels really bind, without prior consultation and consent, the two bodies they represent to do what is written in the document? That is the question this reflection wants to deal with. It is the reflection of a lay person in matters political and legal.
First with regard to the GRP side. Let us presume that the GRP peace panel did not consult nor have the agreement of the legislative and judicial branches of government. Let us also presume that much of the MOA-AD will depend on the consent of both these bodies. If so, it would seem to me that the GRP side would be assuming too much if it were to sign the Memorandum of Agreement prior to that consultation and consent. The Supreme Court could, for instance, strike down the agreement as illegal or unconstitutional. The legislative branch in turn might not agree with changes in government structures that a peace agreement could require.
Moreover from what I know about the reactions of both government branches to the document, I have the idea that the name “GRP” in the GRP-MILF negotiations would represent only the executive branch of the government of the Philippines. Therefore, if it signs the document prior to consultation and consent the executive branch only really intends to do its very best to persuade both the judicial and legislative branches that everything is above board.
Present developments and reactions to the MOA-AD would indicate this. The MOA-AD is now to be argued by the representatives of the Executive branch before the Supreme Court. Waiting for their chance to attack or support the MOA-AD are the members of Congress, House and Senate. What we read in the newspapers about the reactions of some members, albeit the opposition group, does not bode well for the MOA-AD.
On the other hand, the MILF could face the same challenge. The document is to be signed by the MILF on behalf of the Bangsamoro people. But logic tells me that the MILF cannot do so unless the ARMM and the MNLF that also claim to represent the Bangsamoro would first be consulted and give consent. The document could mean an entirely new basic law for the Bangsamoro people. Or it could mean amendments to the present ARMM law. But would the ARMM agree? Would the MNLF agree to changes that could possibly supersede their 1996 peace agreement with the government? Would both of these agree to changes in the power structure within the Bangsamoro ancestral domain that the MOA-AD implies? Perhaps this is one reason that at least one foreign representative has urged the various Bangsamoro groups to come together and forge a united position.
Moreover, the present MOA-AD contains many provisions stating that such and such points will be the basis of negotiations towards a future Comprehensive Compact. Hence, the present document could be more of preliminary agenda setting by way of consensus points for formal negotiations to take place. But as I go through the MOA-AD it seems to be more than agenda setting.
In the light of all the above, the following would be my conclusion: the memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain, initialed by both panels, is in effect an agreement on consensus points. By this document the parties intend to do their very best to have these points approved by the groups they represent. More negotiations and consultations will take place until a Comprehensive Pact is signed, indubitably “owned” by the Bangsamoro and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
But until such time, the document on consensus points would not really be a memorandum of agreement but a memorandum of intent and perhaps one of commitment to take the necessary steps towards a final Comprehensive Compact.
Should either party fail to get such an approval, the peaceful alternative would be for the peace panels to return to the negotiating table and resolve the problematic issues. It is for this reason that the following, I believe, are imperative: prior as well as ongoing consultation and dialogue with various constituencies on the issues of the peace negotiations, information for and education of the constituencies on the historical, cultural, legal, political, territorial, economic, and social dimensions of the peace talks, and the building of support constituencies.
Therefore, as a way out of the present impasse let organized and focused public discussions on the MOA-AD be conducted for a specific and reasonable period of time so that the two parties may be guided accordingly.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 9, 2008
The distinct impression that the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines gives me is that the title is a misnomer. The document is effectively a Memorandum of Intent.
The MOA-AD purports to be precisely what it says, a memorandum of agreement by the MILF and GRP. Both parties agree on the various points of the memo. And presumably both agree to implement them. In this sense the document is a memo of agreement. But can the two panels really bind, without prior consultation and consent, the two bodies they represent to do what is written in the document? That is the question this reflection wants to deal with. It is the reflection of a lay person in matters political and legal.
First with regard to the GRP side. Let us presume that the GRP peace panel did not consult nor have the agreement of the legislative and judicial branches of government. Let us also presume that much of the MOA-AD will depend on the consent of both these bodies. If so, it would seem to me that the GRP side would be assuming too much if it were to sign the Memorandum of Agreement prior to that consultation and consent. The Supreme Court could, for instance, strike down the agreement as illegal or unconstitutional. The legislative branch in turn might not agree with changes in government structures that a peace agreement could require.
Moreover from what I know about the reactions of both government branches to the document, I have the idea that the name “GRP” in the GRP-MILF negotiations would represent only the executive branch of the government of the Philippines. Therefore, if it signs the document prior to consultation and consent the executive branch only really intends to do its very best to persuade both the judicial and legislative branches that everything is above board.
Present developments and reactions to the MOA-AD would indicate this. The MOA-AD is now to be argued by the representatives of the Executive branch before the Supreme Court. Waiting for their chance to attack or support the MOA-AD are the members of Congress, House and Senate. What we read in the newspapers about the reactions of some members, albeit the opposition group, does not bode well for the MOA-AD.
On the other hand, the MILF could face the same challenge. The document is to be signed by the MILF on behalf of the Bangsamoro people. But logic tells me that the MILF cannot do so unless the ARMM and the MNLF that also claim to represent the Bangsamoro would first be consulted and give consent. The document could mean an entirely new basic law for the Bangsamoro people. Or it could mean amendments to the present ARMM law. But would the ARMM agree? Would the MNLF agree to changes that could possibly supersede their 1996 peace agreement with the government? Would both of these agree to changes in the power structure within the Bangsamoro ancestral domain that the MOA-AD implies? Perhaps this is one reason that at least one foreign representative has urged the various Bangsamoro groups to come together and forge a united position.
Moreover, the present MOA-AD contains many provisions stating that such and such points will be the basis of negotiations towards a future Comprehensive Compact. Hence, the present document could be more of preliminary agenda setting by way of consensus points for formal negotiations to take place. But as I go through the MOA-AD it seems to be more than agenda setting.
In the light of all the above, the following would be my conclusion: the memorandum of agreement on ancestral domain, initialed by both panels, is in effect an agreement on consensus points. By this document the parties intend to do their very best to have these points approved by the groups they represent. More negotiations and consultations will take place until a Comprehensive Pact is signed, indubitably “owned” by the Bangsamoro and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
But until such time, the document on consensus points would not really be a memorandum of agreement but a memorandum of intent and perhaps one of commitment to take the necessary steps towards a final Comprehensive Compact.
Should either party fail to get such an approval, the peaceful alternative would be for the peace panels to return to the negotiating table and resolve the problematic issues. It is for this reason that the following, I believe, are imperative: prior as well as ongoing consultation and dialogue with various constituencies on the issues of the peace negotiations, information for and education of the constituencies on the historical, cultural, legal, political, territorial, economic, and social dimensions of the peace talks, and the building of support constituencies.
Therefore, as a way out of the present impasse let organized and focused public discussions on the MOA-AD be conducted for a specific and reasonable period of time so that the two parties may be guided accordingly.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 9, 2008
Will People Accept the MOA-AD?
(Fourth of a series)
While the MOA-AD between the MILF and GRP can be the basis of lasting peace with the Bangsamoro in Mindanao and Sulu, we already see the negative reactions of Christians in North Cotabato and other provinces and of some legislators. Some of these reactions could be knee-jerk reactions with no solid basis. But I believe this is not always the case.
Two immediate reasons for the negative reception of the MOA-AD are lack of information regarding the contents of the document and lack of previous consultation with various stakeholders as to what the document should contain. No serious effort was apparently made to establish a supportive public constituency. Having consultations, asking for directions, providing progress reports – these are proven ways to have people participate in any matter that is of utmost importance to them and their future.
It remains true that many things cannot be negotiated in public, otherwise the plethora of opinions and suggestions, each one passionately presented and defended, would create disorder out of order. But there is a certain irreplaceable and indispensable benefit to people’s participation through consultation and information dissemination at various points in the peace journey. I am quite certain that both the MILF and the GRP have set a certain time for extensive consultations, perhaps when referendum and changes to constitution/law are to be made. But present reactions cannot wait for that time.
The journey to peace in Mindanao is inarguably long and tedious, with many stops and detours. It is almost impossible to accelerate it. Milestones have been set along the way, one of which was the 1996 peace agreement. These milestones are marks of progress. One would think then that along the arduous and difficult journey, certain stops should been made to ask for directions, consult people, set goals and then obtain consensus points at the roadside negotiation table.
This, of course, could simply be hindsight wisdom. Be that as it may, it is wisdom to consult, ask questions, and secure assistance regarding directions and goals from stakeholders, left, right and center. For the government – consult with the different branches of government and with the people directly affected by conflict. For the MILF – consult with the Bangsamoro people, with the MNLF, and with the ARMM. I am not sure that any of these consultations were done -- and in a satisfactory manner. On the GRP side, the negative reactions are open and even hostile. On the MILF side, much less so, except for some ARMM reaction. But the question of Bangsamoro unity (MILF, MNLF, ARMM, and their various constituencies) on the MOA-AD has yet to be established.
For the Bangsamoro people with three different groups wanting to speak in their name, not counting the extremists who claim a certain political or even ideological identity, the need for consensus is as important as for the GRP. For the MILF it may not be as apparently urgent.
There is certainly the imperative of educating all the various constituencies and stakeholders as to the contents (concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance) of the MOA-AD, their bases in history and in law, the steps still to be taken, the recognition of mutual rights, as well as the mutual sacrifices needed by both peoples, Bangsamoro and non-Bangsamoro.
For the non-Bangsamoro people, knowledge of Moro history will sometimes make a bloody entrance because of mutual prejudices and biases, entrenched through four centuries of attitudinal and psychological buildup. A certain injustice to the Bangsamoro people is not a concept that is easily understood by the non-Bangsamoro, much less accepted. One can already perceive the truth of this statement in the immediate remarks of some politicians regarding the MOA-AD. In their present level of understanding of Bangsamoro history and culture, I doubt very much if they could ever acknowledge the right of various peoples, including the Bangsamoro, to self determination, a fundamental right already enshrined in the present Constitution.
For both peoples, the key to the acceptability of the MOA-AD consists, I believe, in the following: consultation and dialogue, information and education, and building a constituency supportive of the general goals and specific objectives as well as the processes and contents of the peace negotiations.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court is an occasion for all of us to reflect on this key to acceptability and work on it. Precipitous haste is not a wise response to urgency nor the way to acceptability.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 9, 2008
While the MOA-AD between the MILF and GRP can be the basis of lasting peace with the Bangsamoro in Mindanao and Sulu, we already see the negative reactions of Christians in North Cotabato and other provinces and of some legislators. Some of these reactions could be knee-jerk reactions with no solid basis. But I believe this is not always the case.
Two immediate reasons for the negative reception of the MOA-AD are lack of information regarding the contents of the document and lack of previous consultation with various stakeholders as to what the document should contain. No serious effort was apparently made to establish a supportive public constituency. Having consultations, asking for directions, providing progress reports – these are proven ways to have people participate in any matter that is of utmost importance to them and their future.
It remains true that many things cannot be negotiated in public, otherwise the plethora of opinions and suggestions, each one passionately presented and defended, would create disorder out of order. But there is a certain irreplaceable and indispensable benefit to people’s participation through consultation and information dissemination at various points in the peace journey. I am quite certain that both the MILF and the GRP have set a certain time for extensive consultations, perhaps when referendum and changes to constitution/law are to be made. But present reactions cannot wait for that time.
The journey to peace in Mindanao is inarguably long and tedious, with many stops and detours. It is almost impossible to accelerate it. Milestones have been set along the way, one of which was the 1996 peace agreement. These milestones are marks of progress. One would think then that along the arduous and difficult journey, certain stops should been made to ask for directions, consult people, set goals and then obtain consensus points at the roadside negotiation table.
This, of course, could simply be hindsight wisdom. Be that as it may, it is wisdom to consult, ask questions, and secure assistance regarding directions and goals from stakeholders, left, right and center. For the government – consult with the different branches of government and with the people directly affected by conflict. For the MILF – consult with the Bangsamoro people, with the MNLF, and with the ARMM. I am not sure that any of these consultations were done -- and in a satisfactory manner. On the GRP side, the negative reactions are open and even hostile. On the MILF side, much less so, except for some ARMM reaction. But the question of Bangsamoro unity (MILF, MNLF, ARMM, and their various constituencies) on the MOA-AD has yet to be established.
For the Bangsamoro people with three different groups wanting to speak in their name, not counting the extremists who claim a certain political or even ideological identity, the need for consensus is as important as for the GRP. For the MILF it may not be as apparently urgent.
There is certainly the imperative of educating all the various constituencies and stakeholders as to the contents (concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance) of the MOA-AD, their bases in history and in law, the steps still to be taken, the recognition of mutual rights, as well as the mutual sacrifices needed by both peoples, Bangsamoro and non-Bangsamoro.
For the non-Bangsamoro people, knowledge of Moro history will sometimes make a bloody entrance because of mutual prejudices and biases, entrenched through four centuries of attitudinal and psychological buildup. A certain injustice to the Bangsamoro people is not a concept that is easily understood by the non-Bangsamoro, much less accepted. One can already perceive the truth of this statement in the immediate remarks of some politicians regarding the MOA-AD. In their present level of understanding of Bangsamoro history and culture, I doubt very much if they could ever acknowledge the right of various peoples, including the Bangsamoro, to self determination, a fundamental right already enshrined in the present Constitution.
For both peoples, the key to the acceptability of the MOA-AD consists, I believe, in the following: consultation and dialogue, information and education, and building a constituency supportive of the general goals and specific objectives as well as the processes and contents of the peace negotiations.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court is an occasion for all of us to reflect on this key to acceptability and work on it. Precipitous haste is not a wise response to urgency nor the way to acceptability.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 9, 2008
SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE MOA-AD
(Third of a series)
To all of us who were not privy to the intense discussions in the peace negotiations, the MOA-AD has a lot of ambiguity as well as questionable presentation. Muslims, Christians, Lumad would want such issues to be clarified, before saying yes or no to the consensus points.
It is nowhere stated in the MOA-AD that the MILF acknowledges the authority and sovereignty of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines over all the territories covered by the term “Republic” in the Constitution of the Philippines. It has been reported, of course, that the MILF does not recognize the Philippine Constitution. So here are some questions.
2.1.Abstracting from the reported MILF rejection of the Constitution, Filipino citizens would want to know in clear terms: Does the MILF recognize either de iure or de facto that the Republic of the Philippines holds authority and sovereignty over the whole of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan?
2.2.Does the MILF, with the MOA-AD, as a stepping stone intend to set up an independent State? In other words, is the MOA-AD an initial process of dismembering the Republic of the Philippines?
2.3.Did the Lumad people agree to being coopted into the Bangsamoro? By virtue of the IPRA Law, do they not in fact have their own ancestral domain? What happens to this Lumad ancestral domain when they are coopted by virtue of the MOA-AD into the Bangsamoro?
2.4.What do the negotiating panels mean by “associative relationship and associative arrangements”?
2.5.Does the use of the term “central government” in the MOA-AD connote the idea that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity recognizes the authority of a central government over it?
2.6.Does the term “shared authority and control” in the MOA-AD connote the exercise of power by two equal authorities, or is it a recognition that in the sharing there is a “primus inter pares” principle?
2.7.Is the MOA-AD faithful to the idea repeatedly reported that negotiations would take place while safeguarding the sovereignty of the Republic?
2.8.What happens if the Congress of the Philippines is unwilling to make the necessary changes in the Constitution envisioned by the MOA-AD? What happens if the MNLF and/or the ARMM do not agree with the MILF vision?
2.9.Why did the peace panels agree to include in Category A many barangays that are obviously Christian-dominated and thus make the MOA-AD unacceptable?
3. At present, I give the MOA-AD and the two peace panels the benefit of the doubt. They have worked at the agreement for years, painstakingly hammering out every word and every phase, every concept and its implications. I know that they have the interests of their respective constituencies always in mind. Right now, despite the ambiguities of the MOA-AD, I sincerely believe that both parties, given the complexities of the situation, have admirably attempted a remarkable balancing between Bangsamoro aspirations for self determination and GRP conviction in its own national sovereignty.
4. Therefore, my present interpretation of the MOA-AD is that it attempts to apply a treasured social principle called the Principle of Subsidiarity. Enshrined in the social teachings of the Catholic Church, the principle of subsidiarity may be expressed in the following way: a member of the social organism may do everything it is capable of, in freedom and self-determination, for its own good and for the good of the social organism. It is only when the member fails to do so that the social organism intervenes and provides the necessary assistance. The principle of subsidiarity is a principle of governance, authority, decision-making, etc., for the secular community. Nowadays Catholic scholars prefer to use an analogically similar principle called the principle of “communion” as more applicable to the Church community.
5. The answers to the questions posed above may prove me wrong about the MOA-AD as a concrete application of the principle of subsidiarity. But if the answers prove me right, then it is my contention that the peace process is going in the right direction.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 9, 2008
To all of us who were not privy to the intense discussions in the peace negotiations, the MOA-AD has a lot of ambiguity as well as questionable presentation. Muslims, Christians, Lumad would want such issues to be clarified, before saying yes or no to the consensus points.
It is nowhere stated in the MOA-AD that the MILF acknowledges the authority and sovereignty of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines over all the territories covered by the term “Republic” in the Constitution of the Philippines. It has been reported, of course, that the MILF does not recognize the Philippine Constitution. So here are some questions.
2.1.Abstracting from the reported MILF rejection of the Constitution, Filipino citizens would want to know in clear terms: Does the MILF recognize either de iure or de facto that the Republic of the Philippines holds authority and sovereignty over the whole of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan?
2.2.Does the MILF, with the MOA-AD, as a stepping stone intend to set up an independent State? In other words, is the MOA-AD an initial process of dismembering the Republic of the Philippines?
2.3.Did the Lumad people agree to being coopted into the Bangsamoro? By virtue of the IPRA Law, do they not in fact have their own ancestral domain? What happens to this Lumad ancestral domain when they are coopted by virtue of the MOA-AD into the Bangsamoro?
2.4.What do the negotiating panels mean by “associative relationship and associative arrangements”?
2.5.Does the use of the term “central government” in the MOA-AD connote the idea that the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity recognizes the authority of a central government over it?
2.6.Does the term “shared authority and control” in the MOA-AD connote the exercise of power by two equal authorities, or is it a recognition that in the sharing there is a “primus inter pares” principle?
2.7.Is the MOA-AD faithful to the idea repeatedly reported that negotiations would take place while safeguarding the sovereignty of the Republic?
2.8.What happens if the Congress of the Philippines is unwilling to make the necessary changes in the Constitution envisioned by the MOA-AD? What happens if the MNLF and/or the ARMM do not agree with the MILF vision?
2.9.Why did the peace panels agree to include in Category A many barangays that are obviously Christian-dominated and thus make the MOA-AD unacceptable?
3. At present, I give the MOA-AD and the two peace panels the benefit of the doubt. They have worked at the agreement for years, painstakingly hammering out every word and every phase, every concept and its implications. I know that they have the interests of their respective constituencies always in mind. Right now, despite the ambiguities of the MOA-AD, I sincerely believe that both parties, given the complexities of the situation, have admirably attempted a remarkable balancing between Bangsamoro aspirations for self determination and GRP conviction in its own national sovereignty.
4. Therefore, my present interpretation of the MOA-AD is that it attempts to apply a treasured social principle called the Principle of Subsidiarity. Enshrined in the social teachings of the Catholic Church, the principle of subsidiarity may be expressed in the following way: a member of the social organism may do everything it is capable of, in freedom and self-determination, for its own good and for the good of the social organism. It is only when the member fails to do so that the social organism intervenes and provides the necessary assistance. The principle of subsidiarity is a principle of governance, authority, decision-making, etc., for the secular community. Nowadays Catholic scholars prefer to use an analogically similar principle called the principle of “communion” as more applicable to the Church community.
5. The answers to the questions posed above may prove me wrong about the MOA-AD as a concrete application of the principle of subsidiarity. But if the answers prove me right, then it is my contention that the peace process is going in the right direction.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 9, 2008
Thursday, August 07, 2008
Can the MOA-AD bring Lasting Peace?
(Second of a series)
The Memo of Agreement on Ancestral Domain initialled by the peace panels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a sign of contradiction. For probably most Christians, it is a document that is unpatriotic, a betrayal of the nation, a surrender of national sovereignty over huge swaths of Mindanao, Sulu Archipelago and Palawan, a selling of Christians “down the river”, a document to be rejected. For some Muslims, the document is not enough. It is a betrayal of their hopes and aspirations for self-determination and freedom, a surrender of territories that once belonged to them by right of ancestral domain and native title.
But the MOA-AD, no matter how one looks at it, is a remarkable document. It is a very serious attempt to balance national sovereignty and Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination and freedom. For this reason, I believe that the MOA-AD can bring lasting peace. Let me elaborate.
The document should be read in the light of Bangsamoro history. This history is not one that our Spanish and Filipino Christian historians have developed. Our history is a history written by one party to the complex human encounter that we call Philippine history, written perhaps by “victors.” Bangsamoro history has largely been one of oral tradition and only in the last 400 years do we see that history written, but not from their point of view.
But it is from the largely unfamiliar side of Philippine history that is also true and indisputable that the concepts of ancestral domain and a Bangsamoro homeland should be understood. The MOA-AD document returns to that concept as a basis for lasting peace.
On the other hand, the document is also remarkable from the angle of what Mindanao is today. Through successive waves of migration and public laws, the face of the population as well as of territories has changed. In less than 50 years beginning with the 1930s Christians now outnumber Muslims in the land once under the sway and influence of Muslim Sultans. The document recognizes this fact. And it is to the credit of the MILF that its vision today carries on the vision of its late Chairman, Hashim Salamat. He had said that his vision for the Bangsamoro people is framed in consideration of present realities. For this reason, the document speaks about the ARMM territory as the core of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. Altogether, the territory is much less than the original Bangsamoro homeland. The MOA-Ad makes use of present realities as a basis for lasting peace.
The balancing act between Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination and national sovereignty may be seen in the concepts on governance, concretized in such terms as “associative relationships,” “shared authority,” the idea of “central government,” and its responsibility for external defence, etc. For the GRP the balancing continues with two fundamental democratic safety valves – acts of Congress and referendum.
Perhaps, concepts need to be clearer. They can be made so in future steps of the peace process as both parties move towards a Comprehensive Pact. But the MOA-AD need not be the document that should contain all the details that would resolve all questions and doubts. The peace process will continue even after it is signed. With good will, patience and wisdom --- and consultation ---such further steps will surely resolve substantive questions.
Therefore, if seen from the perspective of history as we usually know it from our own Christian writers (Spanish, American, Filipino), with no consideration to the enduring aspirations of the Bangsamoro for self-determination in their homeland, the MOA-AD will not lead to peace.
But if the document is seen from two perspectives, that of the Bangsamoro historical past and of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan present day realities, and these two perspectives are somehow respected, then the MOA-AD can lead to lasting peace.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 7, 2008
The Memo of Agreement on Ancestral Domain initialled by the peace panels of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a sign of contradiction. For probably most Christians, it is a document that is unpatriotic, a betrayal of the nation, a surrender of national sovereignty over huge swaths of Mindanao, Sulu Archipelago and Palawan, a selling of Christians “down the river”, a document to be rejected. For some Muslims, the document is not enough. It is a betrayal of their hopes and aspirations for self-determination and freedom, a surrender of territories that once belonged to them by right of ancestral domain and native title.
But the MOA-AD, no matter how one looks at it, is a remarkable document. It is a very serious attempt to balance national sovereignty and Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination and freedom. For this reason, I believe that the MOA-AD can bring lasting peace. Let me elaborate.
The document should be read in the light of Bangsamoro history. This history is not one that our Spanish and Filipino Christian historians have developed. Our history is a history written by one party to the complex human encounter that we call Philippine history, written perhaps by “victors.” Bangsamoro history has largely been one of oral tradition and only in the last 400 years do we see that history written, but not from their point of view.
But it is from the largely unfamiliar side of Philippine history that is also true and indisputable that the concepts of ancestral domain and a Bangsamoro homeland should be understood. The MOA-AD document returns to that concept as a basis for lasting peace.
On the other hand, the document is also remarkable from the angle of what Mindanao is today. Through successive waves of migration and public laws, the face of the population as well as of territories has changed. In less than 50 years beginning with the 1930s Christians now outnumber Muslims in the land once under the sway and influence of Muslim Sultans. The document recognizes this fact. And it is to the credit of the MILF that its vision today carries on the vision of its late Chairman, Hashim Salamat. He had said that his vision for the Bangsamoro people is framed in consideration of present realities. For this reason, the document speaks about the ARMM territory as the core of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity. Altogether, the territory is much less than the original Bangsamoro homeland. The MOA-Ad makes use of present realities as a basis for lasting peace.
The balancing act between Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination and national sovereignty may be seen in the concepts on governance, concretized in such terms as “associative relationships,” “shared authority,” the idea of “central government,” and its responsibility for external defence, etc. For the GRP the balancing continues with two fundamental democratic safety valves – acts of Congress and referendum.
Perhaps, concepts need to be clearer. They can be made so in future steps of the peace process as both parties move towards a Comprehensive Pact. But the MOA-AD need not be the document that should contain all the details that would resolve all questions and doubts. The peace process will continue even after it is signed. With good will, patience and wisdom --- and consultation ---such further steps will surely resolve substantive questions.
Therefore, if seen from the perspective of history as we usually know it from our own Christian writers (Spanish, American, Filipino), with no consideration to the enduring aspirations of the Bangsamoro for self-determination in their homeland, the MOA-AD will not lead to peace.
But if the document is seen from two perspectives, that of the Bangsamoro historical past and of Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan present day realities, and these two perspectives are somehow respected, then the MOA-AD can lead to lasting peace.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 7, 2008
Wednesday, August 06, 2008
What is the MOA-AD in the MILF-GRP Peace Process?
(First of a series)
What is the MOA-AD?
It is the Memorandum of Agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines that consists of statements agreed upon by consensus between the peace panels of both parties. It deals with Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, Governance of the Ancestral Domain of the Bangsamoro.
What is the Bangsamoro people?
According to the MOA, the Bangsamoro people “refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization and their descendants whether mixed or of full native blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the indigenous people shall be respected.”
What is the Bangsamoro homeland?
Historically the Bangsamoro homeland consisted of the territory under the control or influence of the Moro Sultanates. But now as described by the MOA, the Bangsamoro ancestral domain would only include the present territorial territory of the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) as its core and additional barangays in Region IX, XII, and Palawan. More than 700 barangays outside ARMM would be restored to the ancestral domain, subject to plebiscite within 12 months after the signing of the MOA. More towns would be included, again subject to plebiscite after 25 years. Moreover, this Bangsamoro ancestral domain would consist of land, waters, seas, air, and other resources.
What is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)?
The territory described above would have a juridical personality. It is a juridical entity that would have its own form of government and would exercise authority and jurisdiction over the Bangsamoro ancestral domain.
How will the BJE relate to the Republic of the Philippines?
The MOA is silent about the issue whether or not the JBE is part and parcel of the Republic of the Philippines. Instead it recognizes “the Central Government,” and establishes “associative relationship and associative arrangments” between BJE and GRP, as well as “shared authority over territory” “shared responsibility” “sharing of resources,” etc., with a period of transition specifying the relationship. But the MOA also states that “The Parties shall faithfully comply with their commitment to the associative arrangements upon entry into force of the Comprehensive Compact.” Therefore, it may be understood that the “relationship of associative arrangements” will continue even after the JBE shall have been “fully entrenched and established in the basic law of the BJE.”
Will private owners lose their properties in the BJE?
The MOA expressly enjoins that “Vested proprietary rights upon the entrenchment of the BJE shall be recognized and respected subject to paragraph 9 of the strand on Resources.” Paragraph 9 of the strand of Resources refers to forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, mineral production and Sharing Agreements, Industrial Forest Management Agreements, etc. By such reference, privately owned farms and other properties would be respected by the BJE.
What changes took place through the years in the Bangsamoro ancestral domain?
To answer the question and to have a better understanding of the MOA-AD, we need to have a quick recall of history. Islam arrived in the Philippines 200 years before Christianity arrived. Eventually and before the Spaniards came a regime of sultans began. From that time on the Bangsamoro people have asserted and exercised self-determination and sovereignty over their ancestral domain, until the effective political power of the sultanates faded away. The Bangsamoro people came under the control of the Americans. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people became public domain.
But even when the Americans gave independence to the Philippines, many of the Bangsamoro people continued to assert their claim to self-determination and sovereignty rather than be under the authority of the Philippine government. Successive waves of migrants from the Visayas and Luzon in the 1900s, authorized by a series of public laws, gained land titles in the form of torrens titles as against the native titles of the Bangsamoro people.
The population pattern in Mindanao significantly changed from the 1920s to the 1960s. In the 1930s the great majority of Mindanao people were Muslims and Indigenous Peoples (IP), with a small minority of Christians. By the time the waves of migrations ended in the 1960s, Christians constituted the great majority of Mindanao people, with a minority of Muslim and IPs. In other words the Bangsamoro became a minority in their own ancestral domain. Difference in concepts regarding land ownership also contributed to these major changes in the ancestral Bangsamoro ancestral domain.
How does the MOA-AD respond to the loss of ancestral domain?
The MOA-AD restores a certain self-determination and sovereignty to the Bangsamoro people in their own homeland. Because of historical development since the 1900s the Bangsamoro ancestral domain/homeland is no longer of the same extent over which the sultanates once held sway. It is now limited territorially to what is described in #3 above. The MOA-AD also follows the principle that the IPRA law grants to the Indigenous Peoples, i.e., that their ancestral domain is not part of the public domain. The many details regarding concepts and principles, territory, resources and governance remain subject of negotiations in view of a Comprehensive Peace Pact. The concrete type of governance that would be established by and in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity would be determined by a basic law. Ultimately the changes regarding territory will depend on the Congress of the Philippine and peoples’ referendum.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 6, 2008
What is the MOA-AD?
It is the Memorandum of Agreement between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines that consists of statements agreed upon by consensus between the peace panels of both parties. It deals with Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, Governance of the Ancestral Domain of the Bangsamoro.
What is the Bangsamoro people?
According to the MOA, the Bangsamoro people “refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization and their descendants whether mixed or of full native blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the indigenous people shall be respected.”
What is the Bangsamoro homeland?
Historically the Bangsamoro homeland consisted of the territory under the control or influence of the Moro Sultanates. But now as described by the MOA, the Bangsamoro ancestral domain would only include the present territorial territory of the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) as its core and additional barangays in Region IX, XII, and Palawan. More than 700 barangays outside ARMM would be restored to the ancestral domain, subject to plebiscite within 12 months after the signing of the MOA. More towns would be included, again subject to plebiscite after 25 years. Moreover, this Bangsamoro ancestral domain would consist of land, waters, seas, air, and other resources.
What is the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)?
The territory described above would have a juridical personality. It is a juridical entity that would have its own form of government and would exercise authority and jurisdiction over the Bangsamoro ancestral domain.
How will the BJE relate to the Republic of the Philippines?
The MOA is silent about the issue whether or not the JBE is part and parcel of the Republic of the Philippines. Instead it recognizes “the Central Government,” and establishes “associative relationship and associative arrangments” between BJE and GRP, as well as “shared authority over territory” “shared responsibility” “sharing of resources,” etc., with a period of transition specifying the relationship. But the MOA also states that “The Parties shall faithfully comply with their commitment to the associative arrangements upon entry into force of the Comprehensive Compact.” Therefore, it may be understood that the “relationship of associative arrangements” will continue even after the JBE shall have been “fully entrenched and established in the basic law of the BJE.”
Will private owners lose their properties in the BJE?
The MOA expressly enjoins that “Vested proprietary rights upon the entrenchment of the BJE shall be recognized and respected subject to paragraph 9 of the strand on Resources.” Paragraph 9 of the strand of Resources refers to forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, mineral production and Sharing Agreements, Industrial Forest Management Agreements, etc. By such reference, privately owned farms and other properties would be respected by the BJE.
What changes took place through the years in the Bangsamoro ancestral domain?
To answer the question and to have a better understanding of the MOA-AD, we need to have a quick recall of history. Islam arrived in the Philippines 200 years before Christianity arrived. Eventually and before the Spaniards came a regime of sultans began. From that time on the Bangsamoro people have asserted and exercised self-determination and sovereignty over their ancestral domain, until the effective political power of the sultanates faded away. The Bangsamoro people came under the control of the Americans. The ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people became public domain.
But even when the Americans gave independence to the Philippines, many of the Bangsamoro people continued to assert their claim to self-determination and sovereignty rather than be under the authority of the Philippine government. Successive waves of migrants from the Visayas and Luzon in the 1900s, authorized by a series of public laws, gained land titles in the form of torrens titles as against the native titles of the Bangsamoro people.
The population pattern in Mindanao significantly changed from the 1920s to the 1960s. In the 1930s the great majority of Mindanao people were Muslims and Indigenous Peoples (IP), with a small minority of Christians. By the time the waves of migrations ended in the 1960s, Christians constituted the great majority of Mindanao people, with a minority of Muslim and IPs. In other words the Bangsamoro became a minority in their own ancestral domain. Difference in concepts regarding land ownership also contributed to these major changes in the ancestral Bangsamoro ancestral domain.
How does the MOA-AD respond to the loss of ancestral domain?
The MOA-AD restores a certain self-determination and sovereignty to the Bangsamoro people in their own homeland. Because of historical development since the 1900s the Bangsamoro ancestral domain/homeland is no longer of the same extent over which the sultanates once held sway. It is now limited territorially to what is described in #3 above. The MOA-AD also follows the principle that the IPRA law grants to the Indigenous Peoples, i.e., that their ancestral domain is not part of the public domain. The many details regarding concepts and principles, territory, resources and governance remain subject of negotiations in view of a Comprehensive Peace Pact. The concrete type of governance that would be established by and in the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity would be determined by a basic law. Ultimately the changes regarding territory will depend on the Congress of the Philippine and peoples’ referendum.
+Orlando B. Quevedo, O.M.I.
Archbishop of Cotabato
August 6, 2008
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